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ABSTRACT  Based on original fieldwork, this article examines how Nubians in Egypt have mobilized to 
demand a return to ancestral lands along the Nile River. It begins with a historically informed analysis 
explaining how any attempts to make demands from the Egyptian state long have been quashed, 
effectively constraining any comprehensive mobilization. It thereafter argues that the emergence 
of several unprecedented legal and political opportunities in the past decade paved the way for 
substantial Nubian mobilization. This culminated in a Nubian representation in the drafting process of 
the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, and a subsequent constitutional reference to Nubian return. Finally, 
this article explores how Nubian activists have deployed competing legal and historical frames in 
demanding return to ancestral lands. These frames range from the right of return based on international 
indigenous/minority rights frameworks, to drawing parallels with the Palestinian right of return, to a 
less confrontational development discourse rooted in the displacement of the Nubians in the 1960s.
KEY WORDS:  Arab uprisings, Constitutions, Egypt, indigenous peoples, legal mobilization, minority 
groups, Nubia
How do displaced indigenous peoples and minority groups mobilize for the right to return? 
What frames and strategies do they employ when faced with authoritarian governments 
unwilling even to recognize their mere existence? This article aims to offer a nuanced, his-
torically informed analysis of the processes of legal mobilization in an authoritarian society 
through an exploration of how Nubians in Egypt have demanded a right to return to ancestral 
lands. Bearing an ethnic identity distinct from Arab peoples, the Nubian people are usually 
considered the descendants of a specific civilization as old as ancient Egypt itself, having 
inhabited villages along the banks of the Nile—stretching from Aswan in southern Egypt 
into northern Sudan—for thousands of years. Here, the various Nubian groups retained their 
own distinct languages, customs and cultures. After being divided arbitrarily between Sudan 
and Egypt in 1899, Nubians in Egypt effectively were uprooted during the early twentieth 
century when a series of dams were constructed and resulted in the flooding of Nubian 
land.1 Ever since a peaceful military coup in 1952 paved the way for Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
ascendance to the presidency (1956–1970), and up until the January 25 Revolution in 2011, 
Egypt’s political sphere was controlled by a single political party tied to the presidency. The 
 1  Minority Rights (2011) World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, Nubians. Available at  
http://www.minorityrights.org/3932/egypt/nubians.html#sthash.AZOAEZgA.dpuf, accessed May 27, 2015.
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regime headed by Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011) even has been considered one of the longest 
lasting authoritarian regimes in the world.2
Nubia was flooded when President Nasser, in an effort to modernize Egypt in the 1950s, 
initiated the Aswan High Dam project. This rendered yet another blow to the Nubian com-
munity. With the exception of a thinly populated strip of land along the Nile, today, old 
Egyptian Nubia lies completely under Lake Nasser. Shortly after the building of the Dam, 
Egyptian authorities began a program to resettle forcibly approximately 50,000 Nubians to 
new, purpose-built ‘resettlement’ communities in southern Egypt, primarily around Kom 
Ombo, about 50 km north of the city of Aswan. Few Nubians were satisfied with the new 
living conditions, not least because they now were relocated away from the Nile River. 
The problems facing the individuals who were relocated to Kom Ombo are extensive and 
well documented, and include not only a lack of adequate housing but also a resettlement 
process that impeded on family ties and disregarded historical rivalries.3 Many families 
temporarily settled elsewhere while waiting for new homes to be constructed, and for many 
this wait became permanent.4 The ‘Nubian issue,’ as it has come to be called, moreover has 
emerged as one of the chronic human rights issues facing the Egyptian government. Ever 
since their displacement, Nubians systematically have been marginalized politically, socially 
and economically. Any attempts to mobilize collectively on behalf of their group have been 
repressed, and the Egyptian government has gone to great lengths to deny even the very 
existence of any indigenous people or minority groups in the country.
 This article aims to explore how since 2005, and despite the obvious risks, Nubians have 
become more vocal in demanding change, and how through shifting frames and strategies 
they have mobilized for a return to ancestral lands. Throughout this analysis, one must bear 
in mind that Egypt’s Nubians distinguish among themselves in a number of aspects: They are 
dispersed both abroad and across Egypt; they live in larger cities and in more than 50 different 
Nubian villages, most of which do not remain in their original locations; and importantly, 
some Nubians may not self-describe as Nubian, but rather as Egyptian, Egyptian-Nubian or 
any other label of self-identification. Acknowledging the impossibility of fully accounting 
for this diverse group, this article will focus on those activists who have mobilized on the 
basis of being a part of a Nubian collective.
Following this introductory section, in which I also will discuss in brief the conceptual tools 
that I employ in this study, I will pursue a historically informed analysis of why Nubians tradi-
tionally have not mobilized. I will explore how Nubian mobilization has taken place in the past 
decade by considering legal and political opportunities for such mobilization, and particularly 
how national watersheds such as the 2008 Bread Crisis and the 2011 Revolution sparked the 
growth of Nubian mobilization. In a final section, I will concentrate on the drafting and imple-
mentation of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, which is the first legal instrument to make explicit 
mention of Nubia and implicitly to acknowledge a Nubian right of return. In this same section, I 
explore how various discourses have been employed when demanding return to ancestral lands.
This article is based on fieldwork and archival research in Cairo, Egypt, between March 
and May 2014, and in February 2015. Archival research was conducted in the collection of 
 2  R. El-Mahdi (2009) Enough! Egypt’s Quest for Democracy, Comparative Political Studies, 42(8),  
pp. 1011–1039.
 3  R. Poeschke (1996) Nubians in Egypt and Sudan: Constraints and Coping Strategies (Saarbrücken: Saarbrücken 
Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik); and H. M. Fahim (1983) Egyptian Nubians: Resettlement and years of coping 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press).
 4  E. Hughes (2011) Displacement and Indigenous Rights: The Nubian Case, in: S. Venkateswar & E. Hughes 
(eds) Politics of Indigeneity (London: Zed Books).
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unpublished literature available at the library of the American University in Cairo, as well as 
in the Rare Books and Social Collections section. Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
in Cairo and via Skype with a limited number of key Nubian activists. This article also is 
based on an analysis of published and unpublished legal materials, such as petitions to the 
UN and draft laws concerning Nubian return, as well as Nubian-related news publications 
and Nubian groups on social networking sites.
Studying Rights Mobilization 
When explaining Nubian mobilization and demands, I use conceptual tools from legal mobi-
lization studies. Legal mobilization seeks social change through legal norms or discourse 
and extends beyond litigation to include activism.5 The term as such describes broadly any 
type of process by which individual or collective actors invoke legal norms, discourse or 
symbols to influence policy or behavior. The legal mobilization concepts of legal/political 
opportunities and frames, borrowed from social movement theory,6 are particularly potent 
for understanding Nubian mobilization.
A political opportunity generally is seen as a social movement actor’s perception that an 
organized challenge to the status quo will be successful.7 A legal opportunity structure, on 
the other hand, can be seen as a process-based explanation for social activity that involves 
a combination of access to the courts and judicial receptivity. In the context of the Middle 
East, however, scholars such as Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel have critiqued the structural 
tradition of such opportunities by arguing that ‘social movements in the Middle East operate 
in the interstices of persisting authoritarianisms that subjects them to varying degrees of 
coercion and offer them few openings for mobilization. Many of them have very limited 
resources and weak formal organizations.’8
I will draw upon previous studies that demonstrate how in repressive environments where 
civil-political rights are curtailed, violated, or where there is a lack of cultural resonance, 
social movements may not be able to mobilize rights in the same way as do their Western 
liberal counterparts. Collective action subsequently may develop in alternative forms.9 Beinin 
and Vairel specifically have claimed that mobilization, often being linked to the concept 
 5  M. Bernstein (2001) Gender, Queer Family Politics, and the Limits of Law, in: M. Bernstein & R. Reimann (eds) 
Queer families, Queer Politics: Challenging Culture and the State (New York: Columbia University Press); 
K. Bumiller (1988) The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press); and P. Burstein (1991) Legal Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle for 
Equal Employment Opportunity, American Journal of Sociology, 96(5), pp. 1201–1225.
 6  D. McAdam, J. D. McCarty & M. N. Zald (eds) (1996) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press).
 7  D. McAdam (1999) Political Processes and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press); and D. McAdam, S. Tarrow & C. Tilly (2001) The Dynamics of 
Contention (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
 8  J. Beinin & F. Vairel (2013) Introduction: The Middle East and North Africa Beyond Classical Social Movement 
Theory, in: J. Beinin & F. Vairel (eds) Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East 
and North Africa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
 9  L. J. Chua (2012) Pragmatic Resistance, Law and Social Movements in Authoritarian States: The Case of 
Gay Collective Action in Singapore, Law & Society Review, 46(4), pp. 713–748; M. Fathi Massoud (2011) 
Do Victims of War Need International Law? Human Rights Education Programs in Authoritarian Sudan, Law 
& Society Review, 45(1), pp. 1–31; and C. Davenport (2005) Repression and Mobilization: Insights from 
Political Science and Sociology, in: C. Davenport, C. Mueller & H. Johnston (eds) Repression and Mobilization 
(Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press).
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of ‘threat’, takes a different form in the Middle East than in other parts of the world. In 
this region, there appears to be a particular ‘lack of opportunity.’10 Indeed, it is also true, as 
Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper have argued, that a large number of processes and events 
influence mobilization—‘such opportunities … do not result from some invariant menu of 
factors, but from situationally specific combinations and sequences of political processes.’11 
Thus, I will attempt to understand Nubian mobilization in a historical context, in which the 
notions of risk and threat are central.
Furthermore, the process through which movements mobilize ‘symbols, claims and even 
identities in the pursuit of activism’ is known as framing.12 Here I will concentrate mainly on 
what is known as legal framing.13 This framing need not involve the courts—literature on law 
and social movements in fact has engaged with the ‘constitutive’ character of law, whereby 
law in society in general helps to shape meaning and identity in people’s everyday lives.14 
This ‘legal narrative’ approach is important because it can engender a non-instrumental and 
social constructionist view of law.15
Nubian Inaction Explained
One would imagine that the vast resettlement of Nubians in the 1960s would have triggered 
large-scale political and social unrest among the Nubian population. However, whereas 
there surely have been minor and very limited attempts at challenging the marginalization 
of Egypt’s Nubians since then, no extensive mobilization took place until after the 2000s. 
Before exploring this mobilization, it is therefore imperative to consider why this is the case. 
While other writers have focused on explaining the generally very low levels of popular 
mobilization for democratic reform in Egypt, including the notion of ‘flexible authoritar-
ianism’ which entails the selective use of coercion and co-option of political dissent as 
well as pervasive clientelism within state-society relations,16 I want to discuss factors that 
appear specific to the Nubian case. As I will argue, some of the main reasons include the 
role of Egyptian Arab nationalism, Nubian marginalization, Egyptian state repression and 
the fragmentation of the Nubian community.
Egyptian Arab Nationalism
While Egypt was one of many Arab states that voted in the United Nations for the 1992 
Declaration on Minority Rights, the 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights and the 2001 
UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity, government actions at home have focused 
on homogenizing the Egyptian population and on consolidating a single national identity. 
This position was spelled out explicitly in Article 1 of the 1971 Constitution: ‘Egyptian 
 10  Beinin & Vairel, Introduction.
 11  J. Goodwin & J. M. Jasper (2004) Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning and Emotion (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield).
 12  R. Williams (2004) The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities and the Symbolic 
Life of Social Movements, in: D. A. Snow, S.A. Soule & H. Kriesi (eds) The Blackwell Companion to Social 
Movements (Malden, MA: Blackwell), p. 93.
 13  N. Pedriana (2006) From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and Transformation of the 
Women’s Movement in the 1960s, American Journal of Sociology, 111(6), pp. 1718–1761.
 14  P. Ewick & S. Silbey (1998) The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press); and M. McCann (1994) Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal 
Mobilization (Chicago: Chicago University Press).
 15  A-M. Marshall (2005) The Law and Politics of Everyday Life (Burlington, VT: Dartmouth Ashgate).
 16  El-Mahdi (2009), Enough!
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people are part of the Arab Nation and work for the realisation of its comprehensive unity.’ 
Egypt’s statements at the UN also poignantly illustrate this stance.17 In 1994, for example, 
the Egyptian representative explained how the ‘Egyptian legal system is based on national 
unity, that Egypt is a homogenous society and that its people only speak one language.’18 In 
2001, the representative explained that in Egypt, there is in fact ‘… full homogeneity among 
all the groups and communities of which the Egyptian population consists since they all 
speak the same language, Arabic, which is the country’s official language and Arab culture 
predominates in all its geographical regions, both desert and coastal.’19
Even though the concept of religious minority has long been part of Egyptian legal 
traditions, and certain religious minorities—most notably the Copts—have been tolerated, 
ethnic, racial immigrant, and mode-of production based minorities and indigenous groups 
are not recognized officially in Egypt.20 At the heart of Egyptian nationalism, therefore, lies 
the absence of formal boundaries between Nubians and other Egyptians. Rights generally 
have been afforded in terms of citizenship. Will Kymlicka and Eva Pföstl have argued that 
historically this may be explained in part by the Ottoman Empire’s legacy of the millet 
system, under which religious minorities were understood as second class citizens who did 
enjoy the same rights as the Muslim majority.21 Because Egyptian nationalist leaders tended 
to view minorities as being incompatible with nation-building, census data thus effectively 
erased indigenous and minority presence, and it is therefore almost impossible to estimate 
the current number of Nubians in Egypt.22
In line with this Egyptian nationalism, many Nubians appear to have supported the con-
struction of the High Dam, feeling that they sacrificed their old homes for the ‘greater 
Egyptian good.’23 President Nasser’s framing of the resettlement within the ostensibly neu-
tral context of ‘developing the nation,’ appears to have contained the social and political 
dissent that otherwise might have been expected. Feeling that demanding specific Nubian 
rights was, on the one hand, more associated with vulnerability and marginalization than 
 17  See, e.g., UN (1990) Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Doc. A/44/18, 
15 Feb., para. 155; UN (1994), Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Doc. 
A/49/18, 19 Sept., para. 368; Representative of Egypt in UN (1993), Summary Record of the 1247th Meeting, 
Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1247, 29 July, para. 14; Herndl (1994) in UN Summary Record of the 1246th Meeting, Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR.1246, 8 June, para. 36; and UN (2001) Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Doc. A/56/18, 30 Oct., para. 286.
 18  UN (1990) Doc. A/44/18, 15 Feb., para. 155; and Representative of Egypt in UN (2001) in Doc. CCPR/C/
SR.1246, 8 June, para. 28.
 19  UN, Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Egypt (2001) Doc. CERD/C/384/
Add.3, 11 April, paras. 334, 362; UN, Summary Record of the First part of the 1485th Meeting in the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2001) Doc. CERD/C/SR.1485, 13 Sept., para. 2.
 20  S. Zuhur (2014) Claiming Space for Minorities in Egypt after the Arab Spring, in: M. Ennaji (ed.) Multiculturalism 
and Democracy in North Africa: Aftermath of the Arab Spring (New York: Routledge).
 21  W. Kymlicka & E. Pföstl (eds) (2014) Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Arab World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press).
 22  Nubian activists vary greatly in their assessments; some put their community’s population at around 300,000, 
while others go so far as to suggest that the number is approximately three million. See ECHR (2010) Individual 
NGO submission to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the occasion of the seventh 
session of the Universal Periodic Review: Egypt. Available at http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/
Session7/EG/ECHR_UPR_EGY_S07_2010_EgyptianCenterforHousingRights.pdf, accessed May 27, 2015.
 23  S. Allen (2014) Nubians and Development: 1960–2014, MA thesis, Middle East Studies Center, American 
University in Cairo; and A. Mossallam (2012) Hikāyāt Sha‛b: Stories of Peoplehood, Nasserism, Popular 
Politics and Songs in Egypt 1956–1973, PhD thesis, Department of Government, London School of Economics 
and Political Science.
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empowerment, and, on the other hand, could be understood as disloyalty to the nationalist 
project, it appears as if some Nubians chose to wait patiently for the government to address 
their situation.24 Despite their receiving promises that their situation would be resolved by, 
for example, receiving compensation for lost lands, the number of Nubian families in 2010 
who had not been compensated for their confiscated homes nevertheless was estimated to 
be a staggering 5,221.25 As I will explain in a later section, Nubian activists strategically 
have reappropriated this discourse of development to demand a return to ancestral lands.
Marginalization
Much has been written on Arab nationalism, but key in this context is the adoption of 
Arabization policies in Egypt that privilege the Arabic language and stigmatize other local 
dialects and cultures as backward and divisive. While Egyptian nationalism long has aimed 
to be anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and revolutionary, it has been argued that this nationalism 
rather reinforced historical and racial structures of oppression in which prejudice against 
Nubians has been a long prevalent trait.26 Nubian activists explicitly have referred to a 
‘Process of de-Nubianization,’ one that includes resettling Arab groups in the lands to which 
Nubians wish to return; renaming these sites with Arabic place names; ‘pushing Nubians into 
Arabicization through biased educational curricula at the expense of their own languages 
and culture;’ providing inadequate political representation of Nubians in the Egyptian gov-
ernment; and finally, not upholding the obligation to protect Nubians from discrimination.27 
Indeed, it never has been possible to study the Nubian languages within the Egyptian educa-
tion system—after resettlement, the language of instruction in the newly built schools was 
exclusively Arabic, recognized in the 1971 Constitution as the only state language.
According to Tilly, ‘any mobilization at all is more costly to the poor and powerless.’28 
Even though a few Nubians have made it to the very top of Egyptian society,29 a considerable 
portion of Nubians are employed in menial work.30 This also is reflected in Egyptian media 
and films, which often portray Nubians as doormen, servants or drivers.31 The marginalization 
of Nubians in Egypt has led to widespread stereotyping and discrimination, and a 2009 ILO 
report even found that ‘Nubians are not generally treated as equal members of society.’32 
Nevertheless, Egyptian authorities repeatedly have denied such discrimination.33 In Egypt, 
indigenous people are furthermore among the least represented and politically mobilized 
strata of society. Having ‘virtually no voice,’ these groups have had no institutions to defend 
their rights directly or to speak on their behalf on matters clearly affecting them.34
 24  Author Interview with B, February 2015. All interviews were conducted in Cairo and are on file with author.
 25  ECHR (2010), Individual NGO Submission.
 26  F. Abbas (2014) Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and Nubian Diasporic Identity in Idris Ali’s Dongola: A Novel of 
Nubia, Research in African Literatures, 45(3), pp. 147–166.
 27  ECHR (2010), Individual NGO Submission.
 28  C. Tilly (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley).
 29  Notable examples include Egypt’s third president Anwar Sadat who had parents of Nubian origin, and Field 
Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. This may be explained by the fact that the army generally has been one 
of the few means open for the advancement of marginalized groups.
 30  S. Dersso (2009) Egypt: Constitutional, Legislative and Administrative Provisions Concerning Indigenous 
Peoples (Geneva: ILO & African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights).
 31  ECHR (2010), Individual NGO Submission.
 32  Dersso, Egypt.
 33  Egyptian Representative in Doc. CERD/C/SR.1049, op cit. para. 8. See also Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1247, op cit.; 
Doc. CERD/C/384/Add.3 op cit., para. 363.
 34  Dersso, Egypt.
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State Repression
Nubian activists in contemporary Egypt appear only too aware of the risks associated with 
demanding rights from the state. Some even have argued that, as a group, Nubians have 
been largely apolitical for the past half-century precisely because such political organization 
has been met with distrust or been repressed outrightly.35 In Egypt as in other Arab states, 
minority politics is often subject to harsh forms of control and is highly securitized.36 While 
there has been a ‘reluctant and very qualified recognition’ for a promotion of Nubian culture 
in Egypt—limited to mainly academic and archaeological curiosity—any encouragement 
of the existence of a separate group with a distinct language and history has been perceived 
as constituting a threat to the country’s security.37
Because any efforts to promote Nubian collective rights have been restricted summarily, 
most—if not all—Nubian associations have been careful to remain non-controversial and 
non-political. The so-called Nubian clubs, for instance, never have functioned as a tool for 
mobilizing Nubian rights. Nevertheless, they have been the most important point of contact 
for migrants away from their home. The Nubian Club in Cairo, for example, was founded in 
1964 to offer families a place to meet, and later turned into a social and cultural forum with 
branches in Alexandria, Aswan, Ismailiya and Suez. It was more complicated, however, to 
establish the Egyptian Nubian Association for Lawyers (ENAL). In 2007, Egyptian Nubian 
lawyer Mounir Bashir attempted to register an association focused specifically on Nubian 
rights, but governmental authorities sternly rejected his application.38 Only two years later, 
after framing the association’s activities more broadly, did ENAL receive permission to reg-
ister. By 2013, ENAL had emerged as one of the most important mobilizers of Nubian rights.
Although many Nubians appear to see themselves as fully Egyptian, they often have 
had to refute claims made against them that they are ‘separatists,’ and particularly so when 
they have reached out internationally to raise awareness of the Nubian plight. It is also 
for this precise reason that—despite the obvious parallels—none of the Nubian activists 
interviewed in this study have any notable ties with Sudan’s Nubian community, which 
is currently experiencing a similar struggle to end marginalization.39 Egypt’s legacy of 
colonial rule, for which the ‘protection of minorities’ was one justification, has raised sus-
picion that minorities collaborating with foreign powers seek to do so in order to weaken 
state rule.40 In 2005, for instance, Nubian poet and activist Haggag Oddoul attended the 
Washington conference ‘Freedom and Democracy in the Middle East’ where he compared 
the treatment of the Nubians in Egypt to ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and 
called for the trial of the officials responsible for the displacement of Nubians.41 Oddoul’s 
accusations were publicized and criticized widely, including within the Nubian community. 
One of the most pressing issues appears to have been the simple fact that the question of 
 35  G. Nkrumah (2013) No Benighted Nubia, Al-Ahram Weekly, August 15, 2013.
 36  Kymlicka & Pföstl, Multiculturalism.
 37  Dersso, Egypt; and Hughes, Displacement.
 38  Interview D, February 2015.
 39  Y. Akasha (2014) Sudan’s Anti-dam Movement Fights the Flooding of Nubian culture, The Guardian, 
December 12, 2014. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/12/sudans-anti-dam-move-
ment-fights-the-flooding-of-nubian-culture, accessed October 21, 2015. But see this expression of solidarity 
with Sudanese Nubian demonstrations: Nubian Democratic Youth Union (2012) Statement of the Nubian 
Democratic Youth Union concerning the Revolution of our Sudanese Brothers, July 13, 2012. Available at 
http://www.y4nubia.blogspot.no/2012/07/blog-post.html, accessed October 21, 2015.
 40  Kymlicka & Pföstl, Multiculturalism.
 41  Interview B, February 2015.
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Nubian marginalization and oppression was raised abroad. Upon his return, Oddoul faced 
widespread accusations of being a traitor and working toward separatism that would serve 
colonial goals.42
Fragmentation of Nubian Community
As Nicholas Pedriana and others have demonstrated, social mobilization requires in part that 
actors perceive a common identity and sense of shared grievances.43 In Egypt, there long has 
been disagreement within the Nubian community as to which strategies to employ to achieve 
change—and which change is to be sought in the first place. It even has been argued that 
the Egyptian government intentionally has cultivated lines of conflict within the community 
in order to weaken their ability to mobilize. In the words of one activist, ‘the regime made 
Nubians isolated islands and talked to all as if they were leaders, now Nubians are fighting 
over leadership.’44 Other youth activists similarly have argued that the Nubian clubs attempted 
to control any claims made on behalf of the community, that is, they requested that all matters 
concerning the Nubian issue be channeled through the clubs.45 This fragmentation revolves 
around the key question of who has the right and authority to speak for and about Egypt’s 
Nubians. The gap between the generations of older and younger Nubians must be seen as 
central in this fragmentation—the anger of today’s Nubian youth is not just directed at the 
state, but also against the older generation of Nubians. An important reason for this criticism 
is that older-generation Nubians frequently have profiled their concerns as problems com-
mon to all Egyptians, for example unemployment and lack of housing, and presenting any 
concerns as Nubian therefore would be seen as a clear ‘betrayal’ of their Egyptian identity.46
Crisis and Revolution: A New Dawn for Nubian Mobilization 
The majority of Nubians long regarded mobilization as too risky, and ‘risk’ as such appears 
to have been an important impediment to mobilization. Since 2005, however, a growing 
number of Nubians have started to perceive the status quo as a more profound threat to 
their existence and therefore have begun to mobilize for a return to ancestral lands on an 
unprecedented scale. This section explores some of the most important turn of events for 
Nubian mobilization, including the emergence of grassroots youth movements following the 
2008 Bread Crisis, the strengthening of activism during the January 25 Revolution, and the 
two constitutional processes that followed this revolution. I will begin by explaining how 
some of the most important seeds of action were sown in the years before these events, by 
the work of groups such as ENAL, the Egyptian Center for Housing Rights (ECHR), and 
the so-called Follow-up Committees.
Sowing Seeds of Action
The attention surrounding Oddoul’s visit to Washington in 2005 surely placed the plight of 
the Nubians on the public agenda, but it was far from the only initiative of relevance to the 
embryonic Nubian movement. ENAL, led by Mounir Bashir, was also instrumental in paving 
 42  R. Khallaf (2006) Right of Return, Al-Ahram Weekly. Available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/788/eg9.htm, 
accessed May 27, 2015; and S. Mahmoud (2013) Nubian Author Seeks Pluralism in Egypt’s New Constitution, 
Al-Monitor, October 6, 2013.
 43  Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment.
 44  Interview F, March 2015.
 45  Interviews F and G, March 2015.
 46  Khallaf, Right of Return.
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the way for a broader rights movement. Despite being broadly framed to work with issues 
other than Nubian rights, ENAL since 2009 has filed several lawsuits concerning return to 
Nubian lands and/or for fair compensation for their loss and even elaborated several draft 
laws concerning Nubian return. Egyptian courts have stalled in their handling of the court 
cases and most remain pending as of early 2016. As I will explain in a later section, how-
ever, ENAL’s draft laws proved highly significant in the Nubian post-revolutionary rights 
movement. Also important were the so-called Follow-Up Committees, formed in Alexandria, 
Aswan and Cairo in 2007, and made up of an older-generation of Nubians who had close 
ties with the Nubian Clubs. The Follow-Up Committees, since their establishment, infor-
mally have taken part in negotiations with the central government, and proved influential 
in securing funding to build additional houses for Nubians.
 More controversial, and established almost simultaneously with Oddoul’s Washington 
visit, is the ECHR, which has become a leading actor in the mobilization of a Nubian return 
to ancestral lands. Set up to work on the housing rights of all Egyptian nationals, it appears 
to have been the first civil society organization in Egypt to focus fully on socio-economic 
rights. Following the increased media focus on Nubian issues, the ECHR soon found itself 
receiving a large number of complaints concerning the housing rights of Nubians across 
Egypt.47 Largely due to ECHR head Manal el-Tibi’s background in international human 
rights law from the American University of Cairo, the ECHR primarily has advocated for 
the right of return within the international indigenous peoples’ framework, an issue to which 
I will return in a later section.
2008 Bread Crisis: Youth Mobilization 
In 2004–2005 Egypt witnessed the rise of a number of protest movements calling for the 
end of Egypt’s one party rule.48 The rise of these groups signified a drastic change within 
the Egyptian political society and functioned as a prelude also for Nubian action. One of 
the most important turn of events nevertheless appears to have been the so-called Bread 
Crisis, which in April 2008 erupted when a large general strike was called in response 
to low wages and rising food costs. This crisis differed from previous protests in that it 
entailed the extensive use of social media, through which activists and workers sought 
to organize strikes, protests, and demonstrations throughout the country. For a new 
generation of Nubians, with scarcer resources and fewer connections to the Egyptian 
state, the Bread Crisis provided political momentum and inspiration to mobilize and 
demand rights specific to their group.49 Even though this younger generation might never 
have visited ‘Old Nubia,’ it since has become the most vocal and politically engaged. 
One example is the Nubian Democratic Youth Union (NDYU), which Nubian university 
students formed in 2009 to ‘defend the rights of the Nubian people and minority groups 
in Egypt.’50 The NDYU has formulated a specific set of demands from the Egyptian 
government, and has used social media to mobilize support.51
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2011 Revolution: Street Protests and Internationalization
‘We were moving step by step,’ Haggag Oddoul remarked, ‘and with the revolution, these 
steps have become faster.’52 Indeed, the January 25 Revolution, during which Egyptian 
activists organized protests against, and eventually toppled, the Mubarak regime, marked an 
important turning point for Nubian activism as well. Throughout North Africa, minorities 
actively participated in the pro-democracy protest movements, and, in Egypt, minorities 
took to the streets for their cause.53 Before this, Nubians had never taken to the streets 
politically, but now, many participated in anti-government protests. Interviews with youth 
activists suggest that Nubians mobilized not because they believed they were necessarily 
taking less risk than before, but due to the rapidly changing political scene, which prompted 
many youth activists to consider this situation the best opportunity yet to act.54 As one youth 
activist explains, ‘Of course it is dangerous for us to make demands from the government, 
but now we have political momentum and we must act.’55 While most who participated in 
the Revolution did so as Egyptians and Nubians, not either/or, the Revolution offered an 
opportunity for many young Nubians to express ‘organized anger’ against the government 
for a failure to recognize Nubian rights.56 Indeed, many Nubian protests concerned more 
specifically the demands of the Nubian community, even after the Egyptian military took over 
in 2011. Nubian youth protested en masse in Aswan, even torching a government building 
in September 2011 after security forces dismantled their protest camp.
Nubian activists were quick to organize in the months immediately following the 
Revolution. One example is the conference ‘The Problem of Nubian Rights Before and After 
the January 25 Revolution,’ chaired by Oddoul and organized by the Journalists’ Union. The 
post-revolutionary political climate in Egypt also fostered the broader internationalization 
of Nubian youth mobilization. The NDYU attended several international conferences. For 
example, its members participated in the October 2011 international NGO Humanity in 
Action’s conference, ‘Youth for Democracy: Learning from Nonviolent Struggle Across the 
World,’ which was convened in Copenhagen. The following month, NDYU participated in 
the ‘Citizenship Spring’ workshop in Alexandria. This workshop was co-organized by the 
Swedish Institute and the Arab Forum for Alternatives. Activists speak of these conferences 
as key networking opportunities in establishing relations with youth networks in Egypt and 
across the Middle East.57
On another level, however, the internationalization of the Nubian issue brought about 
difficulties for ECHR and its head, Manal el-Tibi. In an attempt to shame the Egyptian 
government into strengthening Nubian rights—an unprecedented and bold move, ECHR in 
2010 had submitted a petition concerning recognition of Egypt’s Nubians as an indigenous 
people to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) as this 
body was completing its Universal Periodic Review of the status of human rights in Egypt.58 
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After this submission, el-Tibi, herself of Nubian origin, faced harsh accusations that she 
was calling for Nubian secession. This ‘very risky’ political situation effectively prevented 
ECHR from submitting a new petition prior to the next Universal Periodic Review on Egypt 
in 2014.59 Nevertheless, the ECHR is not the only actor experiencing such threats—ever 
since they started to articulate their demands publicly, many Nubian activists have been 
subjected to persistent intimidation and persecution, including obstacles in carrying out 
legal procedures and even physical assaults.60 Thus, it is clear that while many of the factors 
inhibiting any previous mobilization still persisted, Nubian activists sought to make use of 
the unprecedented opportunities that followed the changes in domestic politics.
2012 Constitution: A Nubian Setback 
By early 2012, a new post-revolutionary parliament had been elected, bringing a majority, 
Islamist-led coalition to power. Nubians as a group still lacked parliamentary representa-
tion,61 and while they continued to mobilize for change, any significant breakthrough was 
yet to come. After the Revolution, ENAL had elaborated two new draft laws; one guaran-
teeing the Nubians the right of return to their lands, and one creating a High Committee for 
Development, which would ensure that government pledges were carried out in the interest 
of the Nubian community.62 These drafts were presented to the new parliament, and what 
has been considered to be ‘high profile’ meetings were held between government officials 
and representatives of the Nubian community.63 It soon became clear, however, that these 
initiatives were futile, and Nubians felt that their demands once again simply had been 
‘placed in the drawer.’64
Even though Nubian activists brought forward a number of names for the constitutional 
assembly tasked with drafting the first post-revolutionary constitution, Nubians as a collective 
effectively were excluded from the process. Islamist political parties dominated the assem-
bly.65 Manal el-Tibi, who had been elected to the constituent assembly under the category 
of ‘public figures,’ quit the assembly in protest in September 2012, alleging that ‘the new 
constitution and system do not carry any sign of fairness.’66 El-Tibi was only one of many who 
boycotted the constitutional assembly for being unrepresentative, but she stirred attention 
when her letter of resignation—in which she accused the constitutional assembly of leading 
the ‘counter-revolution’—circulated widely in the media.67 Several attempts were made at 
 59  Interview C, February 2015.
 60  S. Azer (N.d.) Can the New Egyptian Government Deliver on the Promise of the Constitution to the Nubian 
People?, Frontline Defenders. Available at http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/25624#sthash.blKNsWkM.
jFNROgBf.dpuf, accessed May 27, 2015.
 61  Nkrumah, No Benighted Nubia.
 62  Ibrahim Al-Agamy (2013) An Unrecognized Majority, Correspondents.org, January 15, 2013. Available at 
http://www.correspondents.org/node/1650, accessed May 27, 2015.
 63  R. Gehad (2013) Nubians Still Dream of Return to Historical Lands in Upper Egypt, Ahram, January 20, 
2013. Available at -http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/62861/Egypt/Politics-/Nubians-still-dream-
of–return-to-historical-lands-.aspx, accessed May 27, 2015.
 64  Interview D, February 2015.
 65  A. Lang (2013) From Revolutions to Constitutions: The case of Egypt, International Affairs, 45(2), pp. 345–363.
 66  C. Molloy (2012) Egyptian Premier meets with Nubians, Daily News Egypt, December 12, 2012.
 67  M. El-Tibi (2012) Resignation Letter to Egypt’s Constituent Assembly, Jadaliyya Reports, October 12, 2012. 
Available at http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7777/text-of-manal-el-tibis-resignation-letter-to-egypt, 
accessed May 27, 2015.
138 M. Janmyr
reforming the constitutional assembly, but the constitution that eventually was adopted soon 
drew wide criticism for falling short on a number of core human rights standards.68
Nubian grievances were exacerbated during the presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Mohamed Morsi (June 2012–July 2013). For many Nubians, the Revolution came to be 
seen as a disappointment in that the Mubarak regime’s strategic framework for containing 
Nubians appeared to live on.69 Already during the run-up to the presidential election, Nubian 
youth protested at Tahrir Square in front of the Nubian club in response to an ‘op-ed’ written 
by a prominent member of Morsi’s party and in which he described the Nubians as one 
of Egypt’s colonizers.70 In January 2013, an astonishing 60 Nubian associations protested 
outside the Egyptian Parliament to demand an end to Nubians’ marginalization and to be 
allowed to return to their lands.71
The numerous actors involved in demanding change for Nubians meant that the commu-
nity appeared more fragmented than ever. The activists ranged from youth groups mobi-
lizing through social media and/or street protests, to the emergence of an ostensibly armed 
movement, to the increased involvement of the Nubian diaspora. One example is the April 
18, 2012 Blog for Nubia Day organized to commemorate the last forced migration of the 
Nubians in April 1964 through a day of blogging and tweeting about their cause.72 Another 
is the creation in July 2012 of the Nubian Knights group, primarily engaged in social media 
activism.73 The group provides online archives of Nubian cultural memory and materials 
related to Nubian political demands, including the right of return to ancestral lands. It also 
publishes a series called ‘Know your rights, ya Noby’ (Know your rights, Nubian).
The Nubian Katala (brave warrior) group was formed in November 2012, when a small 
group of Nubians announced that, if they did not receive political representation as Nubians, 
they would use violence to restore Nubian rights and to separate Nubia from Egypt com-
pletely.74 Most Nubian activists, however, appear to have not supported such an approach. 
Indeed, the rise of the Katala rather frustrated many activists who constantly had been forced 
to refute allegations of being secessionists. At the same time, more radical sectors of the 
Nubian diaspora began putting pressure on the Egyptian government and advocating for a 
return to ancestral lands. Among these is Europe-based Hamdi Suleiman, who made himself 
unpopular among many Nubians in Egypt when in 2013 he attempted to launch the Nubian 
Nile Party. The launching of a Nubian political party explicitly aiming to secure Nubian 
rights would have been unthinkable during the Mubarak regime. Once such a party in fact 
was permitted in post-revolutionary Egypt, however, few Nubians actually supported the 
idea. Some argued that an exclusively Nubian political party would be viewed as highlighting 
race and ethnicity factors, which would ‘alienate’ Nubians from the rest of Egypt.75 But as 
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one youth activist also explained, ‘No one supported Suleiman, he is seen as too radical. 
And Nubians also do not want their issue to be dealt with by one single party—Nubians in 
Suez have different needs than Nubians in Cairo.’76 Suleiman subsequently failed to raise 
the mere 1,000 signatures needed to register the party in Egypt.
Nevertheless, by 2013 Nubian activists had mobilized on an unprecedented scale. A 
series of national crises had sparked political and legal opportunities that appeared to have 
superseded the factors that previously had inhibited any Nubian mobilization. Yet, what had 
they actually achieved? No return to ancestral lands was in sight, and most of the ENAL 
lawsuits concerning Nubian land issues remain pending in early 2016. Additionally, Nubians 
as a collective were excluded from the drafting of the post-revolutionary constitution, and 
international bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council did not address their plight, 
despite pervasive petitioning from groups such as the ECHR. Thus, none of the Nubian 
demands had been met by summer of 2013. However, as this following section will argue, 
the incessant mobilization culminated in the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, which finally 
accommodated the Nubians’ demand for return to ancestral lands.
Nubian Return and the 2014 Egyptian Constitution
In July 2013, after massive protests against President Morsi, the military once again ousted 
an Egyptian president and suspended the divisive 2012 Constitution. A new constitutional 
process ensued, leading to the adoption of another constitution through a referendum in 
January 2014. The processes related to this constitution in many respects appear to have 
unified previously fragmented sectors of the Nubian community. Two different committees 
drafted the 2014 Constitution, in two stages, the 10-member committee and the 50-mem-
bers committee. Although the interim president appointed both committees, it was the first 
time that Nubians as a collective group were represented. The 50-member committee was 
appointed from various state institutions, social groups, and religions; in September 2013, 
Haggag Oddoul was appointed to be part of the assembly. Oddoul, once seen as very rad-
ical following his visit to Washington, had by 2013 emerged as an important and unifying 
link among the fragmented Nubian groups. He brought with him a team of activists, many 
of whom previously had been engaged in Nubian youth movements such as the NDYU. 
The team nevertheless struggled to draw the assembly’s attention to the issues that specifi-
cally concerned Nubians. For example, only six of the 50 committee members attended the 
hearing on ‘the Nubian question.’ As one activist commented in disappointment, ‘It was 
a sad indication of how little the committee really cared.’77 In the end, however, the 2014 
Constitution proved to be greatly successful; as I will explain in the next section, for the 
first time, ‘Nubia’ was mentioned explicitly and the basis for a Nubian return was set out.
Competing Legal and Historical Frames
One must see contemporary ‘Nubia’ as a dynamic space of land, and the demand of return 
is therefore not homogenous among Egypt’s Nubians. Many advocate for the right to return 
to the ‘closest point’ to their original lands around Lake Nasser or to what they call ‘Old 
Nubia.’78 Some are more specific in their demands, articulating precise areas that they view 
as logistically feasible.79 It is thus no surprise that, while Nubian activists generally agree that 
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return to ancestral lands is the most important demand, less agreed upon are the strategies 
and frames used to further this demand. As with social movements elsewhere, they have 
faced both a competing set of legal frames in relation to such a return but also alternative 
historical and political frames.80 I will outline two often employed frames: the human rights 
frame and the development frame.
The Human Rights Frame 
Many of the demands to return to ancestral lands explicitly are articulated through the 
discourse of human rights. Through the use of this frame, the return to ancestral lands 
becomes articulated as an inherent right rather than as a favor. The NDYU, for example, has 
set out a list of ‘special demands’ that the Egyptian state must accept ‘unconditionally,’ and 
which include ‘recognizing the right of the Nubians to return to their original homeland, 
and their right to have priority of the reclaimed land around Lake Nasser where there are 
currently new villages, as well as in the desert areas of Aswan.’81 Some groups, such as the 
ECHR, explicitly relate their claims to international indigenous rights, and argue that the 
recognition of Nubians as an indigenous people would entail that the Egyptian government 
would have to allow Nubians to return to their traditional lands around the High Dam Lake 
at the same places of their traditional lands and under the same names of their traditional 
villages. ECHR expressly draws upon international instruments such as the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR to ground such claims. Yet other groups tie their demands to the discourse of 
international minority rights. The Nubian Knights, for instance, regularly cites the 1992 
Universal Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities as justification for Nubians’ right to return.82 This Declaration, 
the Nubian Knights argue, provides that Nubians in Egypt should be allowed to participate 
in decisions involving their region, not the least decisions concerning the selling of lands 
to foreign, private parties.
Some activists also tie the question of a Nubian return to the Palestinian right of return to 
historic Palestine, and a post on the NDYU’s website is even entitled ‘The Right to Return is 
Not Only Palestinian.’83 Suggesting that both Nubians and Palestinians have been displaced 
similarly from their homelands, one activist expressed that, ‘the Nubian issue is no different 
than the Palestinian situation.’84 Because the ‘right of return’ throughout the Arab world 
intricately is linked to the Palestinian cause, many observers nevertheless have disputed 
the parallels between the Palestinians and Egyptian Nubians, and have criticized activists’ 
appropriation of this discourse.85 These critics primarily have argued that, unlike Palestine, 
Nubia is not a freestanding, separate nation fighting against an occupying enemy, and further 
that the ‘right of return’ only should be associated with UN Resolution 194 on Palestinian 
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return.86 Given the symbolism of Palestine in Egypt and in the Middle East in general, the 
employment of the Palestinian frame when advocating a Nubian return nevertheless can be 
seen as a highly strategic decision. A similar attempt at cultural framing also has been made 
by relating Nubian return to the return and resettlement of Suez Canal residents, who were 
displaced during Anwar Sadat’s presidency.87
In Egypt, it appears thus that the discourses of human rights have created an important 
alternative need and source for the legitimation of individual and collective rights other 
than membership of a nation.88 However, framing the demand of return within international 
human rights law has not been unproblematic. Research elsewhere on human rights activism 
in authoritarian states has demonstrated that speaking openly about the lack of rights can be 
a hostile or threatening act against a ruling authority seeking self-preservation.89 Moreover, 
engaging transnational movements and utilizing international human rights discourse can 
prompt accusations of abandoning one’s indigenous culture and preaching Western influ-
ences.90 As previously mentioned, Nubian activists employing the human rights frame to 
further their demand of return faced repeated accusations of serving colonial goals and trying 
to divide the nation. It is not unsurprising, then, that less controversial frames are present.
The Development Frame
Perhaps the oldest and most widely employed framing is that of development. While often 
listed among the aims of activist groups in such a broad sense that it essentially includes just 
about everything, this process of cultural framing links the call for return with a nationalist 
discourse that could find a broader audience. Indeed, the development frame historically 
and politically is rooted in the displacement of Nubians during the 1960s. Then President 
Nasser employed the term ‘development’ as a ‘tool to distract from social and political 
issues’, and the ostensibly neutral language of development explicitly was used to justify the 
relocation of the Nubians.91 As a consequence, many Nubians saw development as a right 
upon relocation—a right that today remains unfulfilled and therefore constitutes the basis of 
a discourse that is being appropriated to justify return. As Samantha Allen has observed, the 
‘battle over the “right to return” is also a battle over the “right to develop.”’92 However, this 
discourse not only is employed by the elder generation of Nubians, but also youth activists 
highlight the direct link between the right of return and the development of remote areas such 
as Nubia.93 The 2010 ECHR petition to the UN explicitly mentions a right to development, 
which includes a demand of ‘establishing and assisting Nubians to establish development 
projects that can benefit them.’ The discourse of development is thus the foremost way that 
Nubians have been able to make their claims in neutral language, which directly speaks to 
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the Government’s unwillingness to recognize the role of indigeneity and ethnic minority. 
Studies elsewhere have demonstrated how mobilization strategies that receive recognition 
from authorities as valid are more likely to succeed.94 Nubian activists’ use of this frame is 
thus also an important means by which the Egyptian state has influenced movement strategy 
and tactics.95 However, some activists have expressed harsh criticism of this strategy simply 
because it opens for an understanding of the Nubian issue as solely a land problem, rather 
than a social, political and economic problem.96
Article 236 of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution
In the process leading up to the adoption of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, it was precisely 
through the employment of the development frame that Nubian activists managed to make 
their demands of return heard. In an unprecedented manner, they demanded the right to 
return to the land of Nubia (around the lake), and that the population be consulted in the 
decision-making process for development of their land.97 The developmental aspect of a 
Nubian return is clear in Article 236 of the 2014 Constitution, which states that:
The State shall guarantee setting and implementing a plan for the comprehensive economic and 
urban development of border and underprivileged areas, including Upper Egypt, Sinai, Matrouh, 
and Nubia. This shall be made with the participation of the residents of these areas in these 
development projects, and they shall be given a priority in benefiting therefrom, taking into 
account the cultural and environmental patterns of the local community, within ten years from 
the date that this constitution comes into effect, as regulated by Law. The State shall work on 
setting and implementing projects to bring back the residents of Nubia to their original territories 
and develop such territories within ten years, as regulated by Law.
For many Nubians, Article 236 is an important milestone, not least because it marks the 
first time constitution drafters included the term ‘Nubia.’ Others, wishing to emphasize 
the right of return, reject the Article simply for its emphasis on development. ENAL, for 
example, is critical precisely because the Article links the Nubian right of return to nation-
wide development goals. As such, ENAL argues, it serves the interests of the state, and not 
the interests of Nubians, who are granted only the right to return to their lands by way of 
development projects. As Mounir Bashir has framed it, Nubians should and shall return 
to this land ‘because Nubians are not a “project” and they have rights.’98 In the following 
section I will show how Bashir’s participation in the new Committee of Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Nubia represents an opportunity to influence the implementation of this 
constitutional provision.
The Committee of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Nubia
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was elected through a May 2014 referendum, and in 
September, the Ministry of Transitional Justice formed the Committee on the Rehabilitation 
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and Reconstruction of Nubia. This Committee is tasked with implementing the constitutional 
provisions on Nubia by drafting a specific law on return.99 The 25-member Committee is 
headed by the Minister of Transitional Justice, and includes eight public figures and law-
yers from the Nubian community. Several members are Nubian youth activists, who were 
previously part of Oddoul’s team during the constitutional process, but they are joined 
by members of the Follow-up committees and ENAL’s head Mounir Bashir, who had not 
been engaged in the constitutional process. Manal el-Tibi is also engaged, not as a Nubian 
representative but rather in her capacity as a member of the National Council for Human 
Rights. Until now, the committee has elaborated three draft laws on the ‘Rehabilitation and 
Development of Nubia,’ the most recent of which was submitted to the Council of Ministers 
in February 2015.100
The fact that ENAL’s two draft laws, developed in the aftermath of the 2011 Revolution, 
provide the basis for the Committee’s work suggests that the question of competing frames 
does not seem to be resolved with one frame winning through. In the view of one activist 
closely associated with the drafting process, these laws employ a human rights frame and 
thus allow for return on different terms than what was laid out in the Constitution’s Article 
236.101 The first of these drafts intends to detail an implementation plan for the relocation 
of Nubians to Lake Nasser, and the second aims to establish a public, independent body 
to administer Nubian issues, including resettlement around the lake and the reconstruction 
and development of the lake area. All land belonging to Nubia also would fall under the 
jurisdiction of this body.
There are pressing concerns that the constitutional changes and the work of the 
Rehabilitation Committee may not translate into implementation on the ground. The recent 
gains made by the Nubians are under pressure from the increasing militarization of Egyptian 
society and the shrinking space for civil society and political action in general. The entrée of 
President el-Sisi not only brought about an unprecedented assault on Egyptian civil society, 
but also increased the militarization of Egyptian society in general. In light of a new presi-
dential decree that blatantly undermines the work of Nubian activists, committee members 
interviewed in 2015 were doubtful that the most recent draft law would be approved.102 
Presidential Decree 444, introduced ‘without warning’ in November 2014, establishes vast 
areas along the Egyptian border as military zones, including 16 villages to which Nubians 
demand to return. Members of the committee nevertheless have appealed the Decree on the 
basis that it is unconstitutional, and this case was pending when this article went to press.
Conclusion
‘Without social movements, we would achieve nothing,’ one prominent activist concluded 
toward the end of our interview.103 Indeed, in a political climate where the Egyptian gov-
ernment has long attempted to quash any public debate or mobilization to claim Nubian 
rights, the developments in recent years are striking. In this article, I have attempted not 
only to explain why Nubians as a collective traditionally have not mobilized, but also how 
the emergence of several unprecedented legal and political opportunities in the past decade 
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ultimately paved the way for substantial Nubian mobilization. A series of national crises 
appeared to have superseded the factors that previously inhibited any Nubian mobilization. 
These opportunities, I argue, nevertheless were impeded by the fragmentation of Nubian 
activists, who have not been cohesive in their approach to making demands on the Egyptian 
government. While their protests never escalated into mass movements, Nubians as a collec-
tive were included in an unprecedented manner in the 2014 constitutional process. The 2014 
Egyptian Constitution is the first legal instrument to explicitly make mention of ‘Nubia’ and 
to implicitly acknowledge a Nubian right of return. Nubian participation in the drafting of the 
2014 Constitution and the subsequent work on implementing the constitutional provisions 
relevant for Nubian return importantly had a unifying effect on the Nubian community as 
a whole and arguably strengthened a sense of shared belonging.
When it comes to demanding a return to ancestral lands, I furthermore have shown how 
Nubians employ competing legal and historical frames: (1) The right of return based on 
indigenous/minority rights frameworks or the renowned Palestinian right of return; and (2) 
a less confrontational development frame used by the Egyptian government itself and rooted 
in the displacement of the Nubians in the 1960s. I have shown also how, for some, these 
seemingly competing frames actually are intertwined—without development, they argue, 
there can be no return. Although the law on Nubian return as drafted by the Rehabilitation 
Committee clearly has adopted a development discourse as a way to ensure legitimacy and 
validity from the Government, the opposition to this discourse by prominent groups such as 
ENAL suggests that the question of competing frames does not seem to be resolved finally 
with one frame eventually winning through.
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